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Failure Mode and Effects Analysis using a Fuzzy-TOPSIS 
Method: A Case Study of Subsea Control Module 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) is one of the most common reliability 
engineering techniques used for identifying, evaluating and mitigating the engineering 
risks. This technique has received much attention in recent years, particularly in the 
offshore oil and gas industry. Globally, the search for hydrocarbon is pushing the limits 
into deep and ultra-deep waters with subsea production system (SPS) as the preferred 
technology for the exploration and production of this all-important resource. A key part of 
the SPS is the subsea control module (SCM) whose function is essential for the survival 
and normal performance of the entire system. In this paper, the potential failure modes of 
a subsea control module are identified based on industry experts¶opinions and experiences. 
This is followed by a comprehensive component based FMEA study using the Risk-
Priority-Number (RPN) where the most critical failure modes in the SCM are revealed. A 
fuzzy TOPSIS-based multiple criteria decision making methodology is then proposed to 
analyze and prioritize the most critical failure modes identified by the FMEA study. To 
this aim, a distinct ten-parameter criticality model is developed and, for the first time, is 
applied to evaluate the risks associated with SCM failures. In this method, the expert 
opinions are used to allocate appropriate weight coefficients for each of the ten risk factors 
followed by a statistical analysis that will highlight their correlation and relative 
importance. The results indicate that the proposed fuzzy TOPSIS model can significantly 
improve the performance and applicability of the conventional FMEA technique in 
offshore oil and gas industry.   
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1 ,QWURGXFWLRQ 
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) is one of the most popular engineering 
techniques used to assess systems reliability among others such as Fault Tree Analysis 
(FTA) and Reliability Block Diagram (RBD) (Eid Al-Adwani, 2012; Lundteigen et al., 
2009). The application of the FMEA technique dates back to the 1950-60s (Arhagba, 2010; 
Liu et al., 2013) and since then, it has been used in a wide range of industries including 
nuclear, aerospace, mechanical, automotive, medical, electronics and the onshore/offshore 
oil and gas industries. FMEA provides a structured approach to the examination of 
potential failure modes and impact of failures on product operation during field use or to 
the identification and correction of process problems prior to first execution (David et al., 
2010; Wabnitz and Netherland, 2001). The technique is best applied during the planning 
and design stage of a system for optimal results. It is an assessment tool that allows the 
user to methodically list system components or process steps, identifying their functions, 
failure modes, effects and failure causes to rank their criticality or risk. The approach can 
easily be modified and applied to a wide range of engineering problems and applications 
allowing to adjust the criteria from ZKDWFRQVWLWXWHV³ULVN´WRWKHUHVSHFWLYHSXUSRVHRIWKH
analysis. 
The process starts out with a qualitative analysis of systems and their functions, followed 
by a quantitative evaluation of the potential risks as data becomes available as well as 
identification of corrective actions for all associated failure modes as the end result. The 
FMEA study is performed by developing a risk priority number (RPN) which helps to 
compare and prioritize issues for necessary correction. In order to calculate the RPN values 
for each failure mode, three factors of risk namely the severity of impact (S), the likelihood 
of occurrence (O) and the likelihood of detection (D) should be rated (Ceccarelli, 2009). 
RPN is defined as the product of the values for these three risk factors and given by 
equation (1): 
      RPN =  Severity (S) u Occurrence (O) u Detection (D) ,                     (1) 
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where S, O and D are evaluated on a scale of 1-10 (1 = Low ± most favorable score, and 
10 = High ± least favorable score). For each failure mode, the values for S, O and D are 
determined and multiplied together to obtain RPN values, which are then prioritized and 
ranked. Focus is then given to failure modes possessing the highest RPN for the possibility 
of corrective actions.  
Even though the FMEA technique has proven to be a vital and useful tool for preventing 
failures in system design, process and services, the RPN calculation has been extensively 
criticized in many studies (see, e.g. Braglia et al., 2003, Bowles, 2003). Below are listed 
some of the main drawbacks that have been identified (in relative order of importance): 
x Lack of consideration to the relative importance of O, S and D; 
x Different combinations of O, S and D may produce equal RPN values but differing 
implications; 
x Difficulty in precision on the prediction of the values for O, S and D; 
x Varying methods for converting the scores of the risk factors; 
x The RPN is not capable of measuring the effectiveness of the corrective actions; 
x The values of the RPN are not continuous with many holes; 
x The interdependencies across the failure modes are not considered; 
x The RPN is highly sensitive to variations in the risk factors; 
x The RPN only considers three factors principally on safety terms. 
A vast majority of the studies conducted on FMEA methodologies aim at bridging these 
gaps. According to Liu et al. (2013), the techniques proposed to overcome the FMEA 
drawbacks can be grouped into five key categories, namely Multi-Criteria Decision 
Making (MCDM); Artificial Intelligence (AI); Mathematical Programming (MP); Hybrid 
approaches; others.  
Fundamentally, each of the above techniques uses a different approach of implementation 
for coping with the deficiencies associated with the FMEA. Prominent approach across all 
these methodologies is the fuzzy concept. In this paper, an MCDM method by integrating 
the Technique of Order Preference by Similarity to Ideal Solution (TOPSIS) and fuzzy 
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logic is proposed to prioritize the criticality of potential failures in the subsea control 
module (SCM). The method is principally used to overcome the obvious limitations with 
the traditional FMEA. The fuzzy approach is adopted as it eliminates the intrinsic difficulty 
of handling crisp values while evaluating the conventional RPN values (Guimaraes and 
Lapa, 2004). Furthermore, considering the vague nature of the three conventional FMCA 
risk factors ± occurrence (O), severity (S) and detectability (D), they are expanded into ten 
explicit parameters. This is exemplified in a less generic case study from Sachdeva (2009) 
where the conventional FMEA risk factors are broken down into six (failure occurrence, 
non-detection, maintainability, spare parts, economic safety and economic cost) for the 
criticality evaluation of maintenance plans. The scope of the methodology proposed in this 
paper is to allow more flexibility in the risk assessment of complex sytems, through 
reducing the bias of deterministic values and at the same time allow more represetnative 
criteria to be considered in the decision support process.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, an overview of the subsea 
control module and its main elements is provided. In Section 3, the fuzzy-TOPSIS method 
to risk assessment is presented. In Section 4, the application of the method to a subsea 
control module is presented and the results are reported in Section 5. Section 6 concludes 
this study and suggests topics for future research. 
2 6XEVHDFRQWUROPRGXOH6&0 
Subsea control module (SCM) is the brain of a subsea control system (SCS) which is one 
of the main components of a subsea production system (SPS). It is typically installed in a 
subsea Xmas tree, manifold or subsea distribution units (SDUs) and serves as a control 
centre responsible for the distribution of electrical and hydraulic power and the 
interpretation of all signals. Typically, a sealed dielectric fluid-filled container at 1-atm 
pressure protects the internal components from seawater intrusion. Figure 1 illustrates a 
subsea control module mounted on a subsea Xmas tree. There are basically three types of 
SCM (Broadbent, 2010): the all-hydraulic SCM; the electro-hydraulic SCM; and the all-
electric SCM. 
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Figure 1. A subsea Xmas tree including the tree SCM (courtesy of GE Oil and Gas) 
Current SCMs are primarily designed for subsea valve operations and downhole safety 
valve control and monitoring of temperature and pressure at the wellhead. The functions 
of the SCM can be classified as: Low pressure (LP) functions; high pressure (HP) 
functions; remote sensing; internal sensing; control fluid accumulation; and downhole 
gauges control. 
The SCM receives low pressure (LP), high pressure (HP) including multiplexed electrical 
power and signal from the surface via the umbilical. This operation happens in such a way 
that a hydraulic signal is transmitted to the appropriate hydraulic valve in the subsea Xmas 
tree, manifold, downhole instrumentation or any other subsea equipment. Electrical signals 
decoded by the subsea electronic module (SEM) operate solenoid directional control valves 
(DCVs), directing the fluid to the appropriate subsea system valves, safety valves or 
chemical injection functions. Signals from the subsea sensors are also encoded through the 
SEM in the SCM and sent back to the surface facility. The subsea control module mounting 
base (SCMMB) provides the connecting point between the SCM and the subsea Xmas tree 
functions and monitoring equipment. Tubing and electrical cables connect the SCMMB to 
the tree.  
The SCM contains two fully redundant SEMs for controlling all subsea valve operations 
and communications with the topside. The two SEMs are completely independent of each 
dƌĞĞ^D 
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other. If one SEM fails, the control link is switched to the next one for the provision of all 
control functions. Normally, the switching operation is performed manually by the topside 
control operator. Table 1 summarises the main parts that a SCM typically consists of. 
Table 1. Main parts of a SCM 
A base plate Needle valves Hydraulic couplers 
A latching mechanism Subsea electronic modules Electrical connectors 
Hydraulic filters A compensation cover SCM housing/cover 
Selector valves Electrical connectors DHPT assemblies 
Relief valves Accumulators miscellaneous seals, fittings, fasteners and 
electrical components 
One of the key components of the hydraulic system in the SCM is the DCV. DCVs are 
used in subsea control systems to provide hydraulic power to open and close hydraulically 
actuated process valves on subsea Xmas trees, manifolds and other similar subsea control 
equipment. Failure of a DCV can be very critical to subsea control operations. 
A pressure compensation system in the SCM provides compensation for pressure and 
temperature variations as the SCM is lowered subsea during installation or retrieval. During 
installation, the SCM is lowered using a subsea control module running tool (SCMRT) 
onto the SCMMB where the hydraulic couplers and electrical connectors on the SCM base 
plate mate with their associated couplings and connectors on the SCMMB.  
Typically, the SCM consists of four main parts: electrical equipment subsystem; hydraulic 
equipment subsystem; mechanical parts; and the SCM housing. Figure 2 represents a 
diagrammatic view of the sections and parts included in the SCM. To analyse the reliability 
of the SCM, the system should be broken down into its respective components or elements.  
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Figure 2. Schematic of the different sections of the SCM. 
The SCM contains three separately rated circuits: an LP circuit, an HP circuit and a return 
circuit at pressure values typically lower than the LP and HP circuitries (Rowntree, 2002; 
Beedie, 2010 and Bavidge, 2013). Figure 3 shows the routing of the LP, HP and the return 
hydraulic lines in the SCM. The return circuit is common for spent fluid from both the LP 
and HP circuits. 
Both the LP and HP circuits of the SCM are supplied via two separate supply lines termed 
µ$¶DQGµ%¶ZKLFKHQWHUWKH6&0YLDEDse mounted hydraulic couplers. Upon entering the 
SCM the fluid of each line is passed through filters and pressure transducers to remove 
contamination and enable individual line pressure measurement. 
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Figure 3. Hydraulic schematic of the SCM  
Within the SCM there are dual SEMs connected to the two redundant channels of the SCM. 
Within the SCM, each SEM is connected to all electrical components. The SEM is a 
computer-like electronic device responsible for the control of the hydraulic manifold 
system in the SCM using a selection of solenoid driven valves for the delivery of subsea 
hydraulic functions (Saul, 2006). It is also connected to internal and external sensor 
systems for production and subsea condition monitoring. Figure 4 illustrates an electrical 
schematic of the SCM showing the electrical distribution from the SEM to the SCM 
components. The red lines represent the routing of the electrical power lines from the SEM 
to each of the functional tree valves including the choke.   
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Figure 4. Electrical functional schematic of the SCM  
A typical configuration will require pilot valves with two solenoids each to operate, one to 
open and the other to close. The solenoids are driven by the solenoid drivers in the SEM. 
To open a tree valve, the appropriate solenoid is commanded from the master control 
station (MCS), the microprocessor in the SEM activates the solenoid driver which 
energises the open solenoid. This allows hydraulic fluid to flow into the function line to 
the tree valve actuator. The pressure in this line will rise very quickly to a value which 
allows the valve to latch open hydraulically. Thereafter, the valve will remain open as long 
as the hydraulic supply pressure remains above a prescribed value. To close a tree valve, 
the close solenoid is energised in a similar manner causing the spool in the valve to move, 
venting the hydraulic fluid from the tree valve actuator. The used fluid exits the SCM via 
the return line. It is worth mentioning here that most of the control valves in the SCM when 
operated are latched open hydraulically. On electrical power failure to the SCM, these 
valves will stay as is. 
The SCM consists in principle of a pressure and temperature compensated, dielectric oil 
filled chamber, bound by a protective cover and baseplate. Within the dielectric chamber 
are housed all major hydraulic and electrical components. Incoming electrical supplies are 
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provided via two electrical connectors located at the top of the unit. Hydraulic connections 
are made via couplers located in the baseplate of the SCM and hidden from view in normal 
operation by a protective skirt. 
The SCM is designed to be locked to the mounting base through the use of a latch and lock 
mechanism. During the lock down sequence, WKH6&0LVPRYHGIURPDQLQLWLDOµODQGHG¶
SRVLWLRQWRDILQDOIXOO\µORFNHG¶SRVLWLRQZKHUHDOOhydraulic and electrical connections 
are made and the SCM is torque tightened against a mechanical stop. The SCM housing is 
a very critical part because its failure results in the ingress of water to the internals of the 
system (Bai and Bai, 2010). This typically results in the corrosion of exposed metallic 
components and eventual failure of the entire system with time. The SCM is typically 
manufactured from either painted carbon steel, non-metallic materials or corrosion resistant 
alloys (primarily stainless steel).  
3 )X]]\7236,6PHWKRGRORJ\IRUULVNDVVHVVPHQW 
Several multi-criteria decision making (MCDM) techniques have so far been applied to 
analyse, evaluate and mitigate the risks associated with engineering systems, including 
Simple Additive Weighting (SAW), Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP), Analytic Network 
Process (ANP), Technique for Order of Preference by Similarity to Ideal Solution 
7236,69,ãHNULWHULMXPVNR.2PSURPLVQR5DQJLUDQMH9,.25 etc. TOPSIS is a linear 
weighting MCDM technique which was initially proposed by Hwang and Yoon (1981). 
The technique begins with creating a decision matrix: ܺ ൌ ሾݔ௜௝ ሿ                              (2) 
where xij is the rating of alternative i (i =  1, 2........,n) with respect to criterion j (j =  1, 
2........,m). The next step is to normalize the judgement matrix    ܺ ൌ ሾݔ௜௝ ሿ in which the equation below is used: 
    ݎ௜௝ ൌ  ௫೔ೕ ? ௫೔ೕ೙೔సభ   i =  1, 2, .....,n                   (3) 
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Afterwards, the weights for each comparison criterion should be computed. This is done 
by evaluating the entropy ej of each criterion C1, C2 ,..., Cn . Let ej represent the entropy of 
the jth criterion (j «m). Then, ௝݁ ൌ  ଵ୪୬ ௡  ? ݎ௜௝  ݎ௜௝௡௜ୀଵ  j =  1,2..........m  (4) 
where 1/ ln n is a constant term which keeps the value of ej between 0 and 1. The weights 
of each criterion are given by: ݓ௝ ൌ  ଵି௘ೕ ? ሺଵି௘ೕሻ೘ೕసభ      (5) 
The positive and negative ideal solutions are then determined using the Equations (6)-(9). 
This provides a performance indicator for each of the criterion of comparison. ݒା ൌ ሺ݉ܽݔ݅ ሺݎ௜ଵሻǡ ݉ܽݔ݅ ሺݎ௜ଶሻǡ ǥ ǥ Ǥ Ǥ ݉ܽݔ݅ ሺݎ௜௡ሻሻ                  (6) ݒା ൌ ሺݒଵାǡ ݒଶାǡ ǥ ǥ Ǥ Ǥ ǥ ǥ ǥ Ǥ Ǥ ݒ௡ାሻ       (7) 
and  ݒି ൌ ሺ݉݅݊݅ ሺݎ௜ଵሻǡ ݉݅݊݅ ሺݎ௜ଶሻǡ ǥ ǥ Ǥ Ǥ ݉݅݊݅ ሺݎ௜௡ሻሻ   (8) ݒି ൌ ሺݒଵି ǡ ݒଶି ǡ ǥ ǥ Ǥ Ǥ ǥ ǥ ǥ Ǥ Ǥ ݒ௡ି ሻ    (9) 
The distance of each criterion from the positive ideal solution (PIS) and the negative ideal 
solution (NIS) are then computed. The following equations are used for the calculation of 
Euclidean distance of each alternative to ݒା and ݒି: 
݀௜ା ൌ ට ? ݓ௝ሺݒ௝ା െ ݎ௜௝௠௝ୀଵ ሻଶ      (10) 
݀௜ି ൌ ට ? ݓ௝ሺݎ௜௝ െ௠௝ୀଵ ݒ௝ି ሻଶ     (11) 
where ݀௜ା and ݀௜ି  represent the distance of the ݅௧௛  alternative from the PIS and NIS 
respectively. Finally, the preference order is ranked. In principle, TOPSIS method is 
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SHUIRUPHG LQVXFKDZD\ WKDW WKHDOWHUQDWLYHFKRVHQZRXOGKDYH WKH³VKRUWHVWGLVWDQFH´
from the PIS and the longest distance from the NIS. Though TOPSIS is a very popular 
technique, it has some limitations, e.g. it uses the Euclidean distance algorithm which does 
not consider the correlation of attributes, or the weight coefficients are determined using 
an expert method or AHP, which all have some elements of subjectivity. 
In order to reduce the subjectivity of the fuzzy TOPSIS methodology implemented in this 
paper, the following steps are applied: (i) by asking 10 experts, a better representation of 
the scoring of alternatives against attributes is obtained (rather than one deterministic value 
in conventional approaches) and (ii) through breaking down occurrence O, severity S and 
detectability D to more basic sub-criteria, the influence of an exaggerated value is reduced 
in comparison to multiplying the crisp values of O, S and D, addressing the limitation 
reported in the literature (Bowles, 2003; Kutlu and (NPHNoLR÷OX, 2012). 
3.1 The Fuzzy logic to FMEA 
A number of approaches have been developed in the literature to overcome the limitations 
of classical techniques by combining MCDM methods and consideration of uncertainty in 
inputs (see, e.g. Zarghami et al 2008, Kaya et al 2010, Dinmohammadi and Shafiee 2013, 
Ren et al 2013, Perera 2013, Madani et al 2014, Shafiee 2015, ùHQJO and Kolios et 
al 2016). Fuzzy logic is a form of many-valued logic which deals with reasoning that is 
approximate rather than fixed and exact (Kumru and Yildiz, 2013). Compared to traditional 
binary sets where variables only take on true or false values, fuzzy logic variables may 
have a truth value that ranges in degree between 0 and 1. Fuzzy logic has been extended to 
handle the concept of partial truth, where the truth value may range between completely 
true and completely false (Matin et al, 2011 and Medineckiene, 2014). Figure 5 
summarizes the main steps for a fuzzy logic algorithm. 
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Figure 5. Main steps for a fuzzy logic algorithm. 
Linguistic variables are basically inputs or output variables of systems whose values are 
words or sentences instead of numerical values. Generally, it is usually decomposed into a 
set of linguistic terms (Wang and Lee, 2009; Chen, 2000). Membership functions in fuzzy 
logic system (FLS) are used in the fuzzification and de-fuzzification, i.e., mapping non-
fuzzy values to fuzzy linguistic terms and vice versa. A membership function basically 
quantifies the value of a linguistic term. Different forms of membership functions exists ± 
trapezoidal, piecewise linear, triangular, Gaussian or singleton (Chen, 2000; Wang and 
Lee, 2009).  
The triangular membership function is the most popular among all (Kutlu and Ekmecioglu, 
2012) and is represented with three points as follows: A = (a1, a2, a3). The membership 
function ߤ஺ሺݔሻ for a triangular fuzzy number is shown in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6. The membership function for a triangular fuzzy number. 
De-fuzzification ± conversion of the fuzzified values into crisp values
Combination of the results in each rule base
Evaluation of the rules in the rule base
Fuzzification ± Conversion of crisp values into their fuzzy values using MF
Construction of the rule base
Construction of membership function (MF)
Definition of linguistic variables and terms
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Key merits of using the triangular fuzzy numbers are that they are typically less complex 
in computations; they provide more accurate ranking results; they are more effective in 
representing the judgement distribution of multiple experts (Braglia et al., 2003). 
Let X be a nonempty set. A fuzzy set A in X is characterised by its membership function ߤ஺ǣ ܺ ՜ ሾ ?ǡ ?ሿ where ߤ஺ሺݔሻexpresses the degree of membership of element x in fuzzy set 
A for each ݔ א ܺ. 
ߤ஺ሺݔሻ ൌ  ە۔ۓ
௫ି௔భ௔మି௔భ ݂݅ܽଵ ൑ ݔ ൑ ܽଶ௔యି௫௔యି௔మ ݂݅ܽଶ ൑ ݔ ൑ ܽଷ ?݂݅ݔ ൏ ܽଵ݋ݎݔ ൐ ܽଷ    (12) 
where ܽଵ, ܽଶ, ܽଷ are real numbers. Assuming that A and B are defined as:  
A = (ܽଵǡ ܽଶǡ ܽଷሻ and B = (ܾଵǡܾଶǡ ܾଷሻ,    (13) 
then, the addition of these variables C will be represented as  
C = (ܽଵ ൅ ܾଵǡ ܽଶ ൅ ܾଶǡ ܽଷ ൅ ܾଷሻ,    (14) 
and the subtraction D and the multiplication are given by Equations (15) and (16): 
D = (ܽଵ െ ܾଵǡ ܽଶ െ ܾଶǡ ܽଷ െ ܾଷሻ,               (15) 
E = (ܽଵǤ ܾଵǡ ܽଶǤ ܾଶǡ ܽଷǤ ܾଷሻ.         (16) 
Fuzzy FMEA allows both the quantitative data and qualitative linguistic information to be 
analyzed in a consistent way making it possible for the risk factors ± severity, occurrence 
and detectability to be combined in a more flexible structure.  
3.2 Fuzzy-TOPSIS method 
The fuzzy multi-criteria decision making methodology is a popular method for bridging 
the gaps and limitations of the conventional FMEA approach (Kutlu and Ekmecioglu, 
2012; Liu et al. 2013). In the fuzzy TOPSIS analysis, the alternative closest to the fuzzy 
positive ideal solution (FPIS) and farthest from the fuzzy negative ideal solution (FNIS) is 
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selected as the optimal alternative (Madi, 2011 and Kolios et al., 2010). FPIS is indicative 
of a higher performance compared to that of the FNIS, which is being attributed to a worse 
performance. According to Kim et al. (1997), the use of fuzzy TOPSIS has the following 
advantages: 
x A sound logic that represents the rationale of human choice; 
x A scalar value that accounts for both the best and worst alternatives simultaneously; 
x A simple computation process that can be easily programmable; 
x The performance measures for all alternatives can be visualized. 
Figure 7 provides a general overview on the fuzzy TOPSIS methodology. 
 
Figure 7. Fuzzy TOPSIS methodology 
 
In the fuzzy TOPSIS method, the importance (weight) of each evaluation criterion is 
expressed in linguistic terms as shown in Table 2 (Kolios et al., 2016; Braglia, 2000; 
Erugrul and .DUDNDúR÷OX2008). 
Table 2. Linguistic scales for importance weight of each criterion (Ri) 
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Linguistic variable Corresponding triangular fuzzy number (TFN) 
Very Low (VL) 0.0 0.0 0.1 
Low (L) 0.0 0.1 0.3 
Medium (M) 0.3 0.5 0.7 
High (H) 0.7 0.9 1.0 
Very High (VH) 0.9 1.0 1.0 
 
Similarly, the linguistic scales for evaluating the SCM failure modes to the corresponding 
risk factors are depicted in Table 3 (Chen, 2000; and Braglia, 2000). 
Table 3. Linguistic scales for rating the SCM failure modes against the risk factors 
Linguistic variable Fuzzy Score 
Very Low (VL) 0 0 1 
Low (L) 0 1 3 
Medium Low (ML) 1 3 5 
Medium (M) 3 5 7 
Medium High (MH) 5 7 9 
High (H) 7 9 10 
Very High (VH) 9 10 10 
Consider K experts or decision makers using the linguistic variables shown in Tables 2 and 
3 to evaluate the weight of each criterion and the rating of these criteria to the 
corresponding alternatives, the fuzzy rating and the importance weight of kth decision 
maker about ith alternatives with respect to jth criterion are given respectively by: ݔ௜௝௞ ൌ ሺܽ௜௝௞ ǡ ܾ௜௝௞ ǡ ܿ௜௝௞ ǡ ሻ and ݓ௜௝௞ ൌ ሺݓ௝ଵ௞ ǡ ݓ௝ଶ௞ ǡ ݓ௝ଷ௞ ሻ   (17) 
where L «PDQGM «QThen the aggregated rating, xij of the alternative (i) in 
correspondence to the respective criterion (j) is given by: ݔ௜௝ ൌ ሺܽ௜௝ǡ ܾ௜௝ǡ ܿ௜௝ሻ, where: ܽ௜௝ ൌ  ௠௜௡௞ ሼܽ௜௝௞ ሽ,  ܾ௜௝ ൌ ଵ௄  ? ܾ௜௝௞௞௜௝ , and  ܿ௜௝ ൌ  ௠௔௫௞ ሼܿ௜௝௞ ሽ,    (18) 
Similarly, the aggregated weight ݓ௜௝ of each criterion is ݓ௜௝ ൌ ሺݓ௝ଵǡ ݓ௝ଶǡ ݓ௝ଷሻ, where 
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 ݓ௝ଵ ൌ  ௠௜௡௞ ሼݓ௝௞ଵሽ,  ݓ௝ଶ ൌ  ଵ௄  ?ݓ௝௞ଶ,  , and  ݓ௝ଷ ൌ  ௠௔௫௞ ሼݓ௝௞ଷሽ (19) 
Accordingly, a fuzzy decision matrix of the alternatives can then be represented in the 
format below: 
          ܿଵܿଶ ǥ ǥ Ǥ ܿ௡ 
ܦ ൌ  ܣଵܣଶܣ௠ ቌ
ݔଵଵݔଶଵǥݔ௠ଵ
ݔଵଶݔଶଶǥݔ௠ଶ
ǥǥݔ௜௝ǥ ݔଵ௡ݔଶ௡ǥݔ௠௡ቍ     (20) 
where ܹ ൌ  ሺݓଵǡ ݓଶǡǥǥǥǥǤǤݓ௡ሻ represents the weights of the criteria. 
Here xij are built by failure modes ܣ௜ ሺ݅ ൌ  ?ǡ ǥ Ǥ Ǥ ݉ሻ, which are evaluated against criterion ܥ௝ ሺ݆ ൌ  ?ǡ ǥ ǥ Ǥ Ǥ ݊ሻ. To avoid complication, a linear scale transformation is used for the 
normalisation process of the criteria scale. The fuzzy normalised decision matrix is given 
by: 
 ܀෩ ൌ ൣݎǁ௜௝൧௠௡=  ൦ ݎଵଵݎଶଵڭݎ௠ଵ
ݎଵଶݎଵଵڭݎ௠ଶ
ǥǥڭ ݎଵ௡ݎଵଵڭݎ௠௡൪     (21) 
where L «PM «QThe normalised values for benefit and cost related criteria 
are as shown below: ݎǁ௜௝ ൌ  ൬௔೔ೕ௖ೕכ ǡ ௕೔ೕ௖ೕכ ǡ ௖೔ೕ௖ೕכ ൰, and ௝ܿכ ൌ  ୫ୟ୶ ௖೔ೕ௜ Ǣ ሺ݆ א ܤǡ ܾ݂݁݊݁݅ݐܿݎ݅ݐ݁ݎ݅ܽሻ  (22) ݎǁ௜௝ ൌ  ൬௔ೕష௖೔ೕ ǡ ௔ೕష௕೔ೕ ǡ ௔ೕష௖೔ೕ൰, and ௝ܽି ൌ  ୫୧୬ ௔೔ೕ௜ Ǣ ሺ݆ א ܥǡ ܿ݋ݏݐܿݎ݅ݐ݁ݎ݅ܽሻ  (23) 
The normalisation process here preserves and maintains the triangular fuzzy numbers 
within the range [0, 1]. Considering the weight of each criterion, the weighted normalised 
fuzzy matrix is computed as: ෨ܸ ൌ ሾݒ௜௝ሿ௠௡, L «P ;  M «Q           (24) 
where  ݒ௜௝ ൌ  ݎǁ௜௝ሺǤ ሻݓ෥௝     (25) 
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The FPIS and FNIS of the ith failure modes (Ai) are then defined by Equations (26) and 
(27) as follows: ܣכ ൌ ሺݒ෤ଵכǡ ݒ෤ଶכǡ ǥ ǥ ǡ ݒ෤௡כሻ    (26) 
where  ݒ௝כ ൌ  ௠௔௫௜ ൛ݒ௜௝ଷൟǡ݅ ൌ  ?ǡ ?ǡ ǥ Ǥ Ǥ ǡ ݉Ǣ ݆ ൌ  ?ǡ ?ǡ ǥ ǥ Ǥ Ǥ ǡ ݊ ܣି ൌ ሺݒ෤ଵି ǡ ݒ෤ଶି ǡ ǥ ǥ ǡ ݒ෤௡ି ሻ    (27) 
whereݒ௝ି ൌ  ௠௜௡௜ ൛ݒ௜௝ଵൟǡ݅ ൌ  ?ǡ ?ǡ ǥ Ǥ Ǥ ǡ ݉Ǣ ݆ ൌ  ?ǡ ?ǡ ǥ ǥ Ǥ Ǥ ǡ ݊ 
The distances ሺ݀௜כܽ݊݀݀௜ି ሻ of the failure modes (Ai L «Pfrom the FPIS (A+ ) and 
FNIS (A-) respectively are calculated using the following equations: ݀௜כ ൌ  ? ݀௩௡௝ୀଵ ൫ݒ෤௜௝ ǡ ݒ෤௝כ൯ǡ ݅ ൌ  ?ǡ ?ǡ ǥ ǡ ݉Ǥ   (28) ݀௜ି ൌ  ? ݀௩௡௝ୀଵ ൫ݒ෤௜௝ǡ ݒ෤௝ି ൯ǡ ݅ ൌ  ?ǡ ?ǡ ǥ ǡ  ݉   (29) 
where ݀௩ሺ ෤ܽǡ ෨ܾሻ denotes the Euclidean distance between two fuzzy numbers ෤ܽ ෨ܾ. 
The closeness coefficient ܥܥ௜   is then calculated to determine the ranking of each 
alternative (AiL «P The closeness coefficient is given by: ܥܥ௜ ൌ  ௗ೔షௗ೔షାௗ೔כ ǡ݅ ൌ  ?ǡ ?ǡ ǥ ǥ ǥ ǥ ݉Ǥ   (30) 
With respect to the evaluation of SCM failure modes using the fuzzy-TOPSIS 
methodology, the failure mode with the highest closeness coefficient ܥܥ௜ (i.e., closest to 
the FPIS and farthest from the FNIS) represent the one with the highest risk. The 
components associated with higher risk failure modes will require a closer attention and 
focus for subsea control module (SCM) design evaluation, close attention during 
manufacturing and would demand a good attention during installation and operations. 
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4 &DVHVWXG\DSSOLFDWLRQ 
It is reported in the industry that SCM is one of the components suffering from high failure 
rates in offshore subsea production system (Brandt and Eriksen, 2001). The SCM failures 
can have substantial economic and environmental consequences. The failure consequences 
are further amplified by increased water depth because a well support vessel (WSV) and a 
remote operated vehicle at a high cost will be required for the SCM retrieval, repair and 
replacement. The failure modes (Fi) under consideration include thirty (30) potential drawn 
from a comprehensive evaluation of SCM failure modes considering each of the key 
components and subsystems in the subsea control module, as summarized in Table 4. 
Table 4. SCM failure modes (Fi) under consideration 
F1 
Loss of power supply from the SEM Unit 
F16 
Loss of SCM pressure compensation 
F2  
SCM housing check valve cracks open at lower 
pressure 
F17 
HP DCV fails to open on command 
F3 
Total Loss of signal from the SEM module 
F18 
LP DCV fails to open on command 
F4 
Loss of LP hydraulic filtration 
F19 
HP DCV shuts spuriously from the open 
position 
F5 
Severe leakage from HP DCV 
F20 
HP DCV fails to shut on demand from the 
open position 
F6 
Loss of HP hydraulic filtration 
F21 
LP DCV fails to shut on demand from the 
open position 
F7 
Loss of HP Accumulation 
F22 
Loss of monitoring signal from the water 
ingress sensor 
F8 
Severe leakage from LP DCV 
F23 
LP selector valve spuriously closes 
F9 
Severe leakage on the LP Shuttle valve 
F24 
LP DCV shuts spuriously from the open 
position 
F10 
Severe leakage on the HP shuttle valve 
F25 
Loss of electronic monitoring of the LP 
supply pressure 
F11 
Loss of LP accumulation 
F26 
Loss of electronic monitoring of the HP 
supply pressure 
F12 
Shuttle valve fails to change over to the next 
HP supply line 
F27 
Loss of electronic monitoring of the LP 
return flow 
F13 
Severe leak in the LP common hydraulic 
header 
F28 
Loss of electronic monitoring of the HP 
return flow 
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F14 
Shuttle valve fails to change over to the next LP 
supply line 
F29 
Loss of the SCM internal pressure 
monitoring 
F15 
LP selector valve fails to open 
F30 
Loss of the SCM internal temperature 
monitoring 
The failure modes listed in Table 4 DUHEDVHGRQWKH6&0¶Vintrinsic components and the 
requirement to deliver specified functions. Failures due to external factors such as 
installation errors, testing or equipment transportation are not included in this analysis. 
4.1 Conventional FMEA study  
In the conventional FMEA analysis, the three risk factors of occurrence (O), severity (S) 
and detectability (D) are evaluated according to a scale of 1-10 (1 = No severity, nearly 
impossible occurrence, almost certain detection, and 10 = Hazardous severity, extremely 
high probability of occurrence, and absolutely uncertain detectability) and then, the 
associated risk priority number (RPN) is calculated for each of the failure modes. This 
involved a wide consultation of industry experts. The data used in this analysis were 
obtained through expert elicitation (EE). To ensure credibility, a systematic process was 
applied for obtaining and processing the data. Below are some steps that were taken during 
the survey in order to ensure a more objective and accurate results: 
x Each of the experts were engaged in a structured interview. Twenty five experts 
were contacted, but ten of them responded.  
x Experts were interviewed across different operating units and across continents 
from Europe, Africa through to Americas. This ensured the decisions were not 
skewed. 
x The experts were chosen from major oil and gas operators, subsea equipment 
manufacturers and the engineering consultancy firms. 
x The experts were given an opportunity to revise their assessments before sending 
in the final results. 
x During the engagement, the experts were asked to state the rationale behind their 
evaluations. 
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4.2 Fuzzy-TOPSIS FMEA study 
In this analysis, the three risk factors of occurrence (O), severity (S) and detectability (D) 
are broken down into more appreciable units for better comprehension. Table 5 shows the 
breakdown of the conventional risk factors into ten risk assessment criteria. 
Table 5. Risk assessment criteria expanded from conventional FMEA risk factors. 
Risk factor Criteria Description 
Occurrence 
R1 Occurrence associated with water depth 
R2 Occurrence under normal operation 
R3 Occurrence under extreme conditions 
Severity 
R4 Direct Cost of failure 
R5 Indirect cost of failure 
R6 Failure impact on environment 
R7 Fatality associated with failure 
R8 Risk to business ± non-financial 
Detection 
R9 Detectability 
R10 Redundancy 
The occurrence factor in the conventional FMEA represents the probability of the 
respective failure modes to occur. However, it does not in any way define the environment 
or functional boundary for which the probability is being predicted. This makes the value 
a bit vague and unrepresentative of the true setting for the evaluation of the failure 
probability. In order to make this more explicit and paint the picture of the true scenario, 
the occurrence factor is split into three different factors, namely: 
x Occurrence associated with water depth (R1): It represents the risk of failures in relation 
to increase in water depth. In the ocean environments, it has been proven that every 
10m increase in water depth results in a proportional hydrostatic pressure increase of 
1bar with attendant effect on subsea systems. The change in pressure, temperature, 
salinity and other depth-varying sea parameters constitute potential sources of failure 
to the SCM. The R1 evaluates these in correspondence to each of the failure modes. 
x Occurrence under normal operation (R2): It evaluates the probability of the system 
failure under a defined set of functional design parameters. SCMs designed within a 
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known operational boundary are still known to fail even with correctly defined 
functional parameters. This parameter is used in rating such failures. 
x Occurrence under extreme conditions (R3): Sometimes the SCM is found operate in 
unpredictable conditions that are outside their standard design specifications like higher 
pressure ratings, temperature range, salinity, etc. The R3 factor evaluates the probability 
of failure occurrence when the system is operated beyond its defined design 
specification. For example, what is the probability that an SCM designed to operate 
with a maximum LP working pressure of 3000psi will fail if the actual flow pressure 
in the LP circuitry increases to 3010psi, which is outside its design limits. 
In the same way as occurrence, the severity factor in FMEA study represents the impact of 
a failure mode on the user or customer if the corresponding failure occurs. The factor is a 
little vague because it only assesses the severity of a failure in terms of cost consequences 
and ignores the damages to environment or fatalities. For this reason, we split this 
parameter into the following risk factors: 
x Direct cost of failure (R4)6&0FRPSRQHQWV¶IDLOXUHOHDGVWR ORVVLQUHYHQXHDVWKH
part/subsystem may require repair or outright replacement. The risk factor R4 represents 
the direct cost associated with repair or outright replacement of the faulty component 
(e.g. cost of SCM filter, cost of LP sensor, unit cost of DCV, etc.). 
x Indirect cost of failure (R5): It evaluates the level of secondary costs associated with 
restoring the component function back to service. A typical failure in the offshore 
environment requires hiring and sending a number of maintenance vessels to facilities 
which may be very expensive. 
x Impact of failure on environment (R6): This factor evaluates the impact of each failure 
on the offshore environment. It includes parameters like discharge to sea and failure 
impact on aquatic life. 
x Fatality associated with failure (R7): It assesses the severity of a failure mode in terms 
of number of lives lost. For SCMs operating in deep and ultra-deep waters, injuries are 
unlikely to happen since the operation is typically performed using the remote operated 
vehicles (ROVs). However, this may not be completely ruled out in shallow waters 
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where divers are sometimes used. Loss of live may occur from failures associated with 
the high pressure systems or even from failures associated with the power units. 
x Risk to business (non-financial) (R8): Not all of impacts associated with failures can 
actually be quantified in terms of cost, damage to environment or fatality. Some failures 
may have effect on the business in a global perspective which is presented by R8. For 
example, a failure in the HP circuitry leading to a shutdown of the well will reduce the 
level of production. 
Other risk factors used in our analysis are: detectability (R9) and redundancy (R10). These 
factors are principally safeguards, which are introduced into the system to enhance 
availability. The R9 factor evaluates the ease for which a failure mode occurrence can be 
detected. Sensors are the primary means of failure detection in subsea systems. They 
provide process data and parameters for assessing the condition of an equipment or 
component. Examples of sensors in the subsea environment are combined pressure and 
temperature sensors, flow sensors, level sensors, pressure sensors, sand detectors/fluid 
cleanliness, temperature sensor, valve position sensor, etc. Nevertheless, not all failure 
modes can be detected using sensors. This factor evaluates the risks involved in the 
inability to detect the respective failure modes.  
Due to the huge risk associated with failure of systems in the subsea environment, most 
systems are operated in redundancy. The risk factor R10 assesses the risks associated with 
the requirement and loss of redundancy in relation to the corresponding failure mode. For 
example, in a typical SCM, there are two subsea electronic modules (SEMs) operated in 
redundancy. If one fails, the system switches to the next one for continued operations. Loss 
of this redundant SEM means a loss of power to all the LP and DCVs and a total loss of 
communications from the downhole well system as well as a loss in signal to the topside 
operator. The impact here is severe as it leads to a total shutdown of the well and requires 
a support vessel for the retrieval of the SCM in order to fix the failure. 
In this evaluation, the limitation for use of data from databases was examined, as the 
information is typically skewed to the function specification of the system under study 
including the specific environment being examined. To overcome this limitation, expert 
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elicitation technique were applied. A survey was designed for evaluating the weight of the 
SCM risk factors including the rating of these risk factors to the corresponding failure 
modes. Ten (10) reputable experts in the offshore subsea industry cutting across oil and 
gas operators, original equipment manufacturers (OEMs), and industry design consultants 
were surveyed for the exercise. The survey had two sections. The first section focused on 
the importance of the risk factors. This is called weight evaluation and represents the 
significance of the respective risk factors in the SCM system¶V reliability. In the second 
section, the risk factors were then used in establishing a rating with the respective failure 
modes. 
5 5HVXOWVDQGGLVFXVVLRQ 
The failure modes (Fi) under consideration include thirty (30) drawn from a comprehensive 
evaluation of SCM failure modes considering each of the key components and subsystems 
in the subsea control module and the corresponding possible causes of their failures. The 
results of the conventional FMEA study, including the lists of the failures modes, 
corresponding IDs, the RPN values and their rakings are given in Table 6. 
Table 6. The results of the conventional FMEA study on SCM 
Failure 
ID RPN 
Failure 
Mode 
Ranking 
Failure 
ID RPN 
Failure 
Mode 
Ranking 
Failure 
ID RPN 
Failure 
Mode 
Ranking 
F1 288 1 F12 72 10 F18 42 19 
F9 252 2 F10 70 12 F27 42 19 
F5 144 3 F4 63 13 F17 36 23 
F7 144 3 F13 56 14 F22 30 24 
F3 140 5 F19 56 14 F20 28 25 
F2 112 6 F26 54 16 F28 27 26 
F8 96 7 F21 48 17 F23 24 27 
F14 96 7 F15 48 17 F25 24 27 
F11 84 9 F16 42 19 F29 18 29 
F6 72 10 F24 42 19 F30 16 30 
The results of the RPN evaluations show the following as the top ten (10) most critical 
failures in the SCM. 
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x Loss of power supply from the SEM Unit  
x Severe leakage on the LP Shuttle valve 
x Severe leakage from HP DCV 
x Loss of HP Accumulation  
x Total loss of signal from the SEM module  
x SCM housing check valve cracks open at lower pressure 
x Severe leakage from LP DCV 
x Shuttle valve fails to change over to the next LP supply line  
x Loss of LP accumulation 
x Loss of HP hydraulic filtration 
To implement the FMEA study based on the fuzzy-TOPSIS technique, ten experts, D1 to 
D10, from the subsea industry were surveyed to obtain the weights (relative importance) of 
risk assessment parameters as shown in Table 7. The relative importance of these risk 
factors against the failure modes was also obtained. The evaluation is such that, for 
example, if increase in water depth increases the probability of occurrence of one failure 
mode, the rating value is expected to have a high value and vice versa. A high value for all 
the risk factors implies a big risk for the respective failure mode being evaluated. 
Table 7. Importance weights of the risk factors. 
 Importance weight Evaluation 
 D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8 D9 D10 
R1 VH VH VH H VH VH VH VH VH VH 
R2 VH H H VH VH VH VH VH H H 
R3 H H H H M H H H M M 
R4 M M M M H H H H H VH 
R5 VH VH VH H VH VH VH VH H H 
R6 M M H H M M M H H H 
R7 L L M L M M L M H M 
R8 H H M H M M M M M M 
R8 VH H H VH H M H H VH VH 
R10 H H VH H VH VH VH H VH H 
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Next, the experts use the linguistic variables as given in Table 3 to evaluate the rating of 
the risk factors to the corresponding failure modes. The fuzzy decision matrix and fuzzy 
weights of the failure modes using Tables 2 and 3 are shown in Table 8. Though the experts 
were selected from different countries, the values were relatively even with very minor 
deviations in the opinions provided. 
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Table 8. Fuzzy decision matrix for the failure modes (Fi) and the respective weights of the risk factors (Ri) 
Failure 
Mode ID 
R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9 R10 
W1 W2 W3 W4 W5 W6 W7 W8 W9 W10 
(0.7, 0.99, 1.0) (0.7, 0.96, 1.0) (0.3, 0.78, 1.0) (0.3, 0.75, 1.0) (0.7, 0.97, 1.0) (0.3, 0.7, 1.0) (0.0, 3.9, 1.0) (0.3, 0.6, 1.0) (0.3, 0.9, 1.0) (0.7, 0.95, 1.0) 
F1 (0, 0.8, 3) (5, 7.8, 10) (7, 9.9, 10) (7, 9.4, 10) (9, 10, 10)  (0, 0.3, 3)  (0, 0.1, 3)  (0, 2.1, 7)  (0, 0.9, 3)  (9, 10, 10)  
F2 (5, 9.3, 10) (0, 0.9, 5) (7, 9.6, 10) (3, 5.0, 7) (7, 9.9, 10)  (0, 3, 10)  (0, 0, 1)  (0, 0.7, 7)  (7, 9, 10)  (1, 4.8, 5)  
F3 (0, 1.8, 7) (1, 5.2, 9) (7, 9.4, 10) (7, 9.3, 10) (9, 10, 10)  (0, 0.7, 7)  (0, 0, 1)  (0, 1.7, 7)  (0, 0.2, 3)  (7, 9.8, 10) 
F4 (0, 0.4, 3) (0, 0.9, 5) (7, 9.5, 10) (, 7.2, 10) (5, 7.2, 10)  (0, 0.2, 3)  (0, 0, 1)  (0, 2.8, 5)  (7, 9.8, 10)  (7, 9.2, 10)  
F5 (0, 1.4, 5) (0, 4.2, 7) (7, 9.3, 10) (3, 7.8, 9) (7, 0.1, 3)  (7, 9.2, 10)  (0, 0.1, 3)  (5, 79)  (0, 2.0, 7)  (5, 8.2, 10)  
F6 (0, 0.1, 3) (0, 2.8, 7) (5, 8.7, 10) (0, 1.0, 3) (7, 9.6, 10)  (0, 1.2, 10)  (0, 0.1, 3)  (0, 1.0, 5)  (7, 9.4, 10)  (5, 8.0, 10)  
F7 (3, 5.6, 9) (0, 0.7, 5) (5, 8.9, 10) (3, 6.4, 9) (5, 7.2, 10)  (0, 0.4, 3)  (0, 0.1, 3)  (1, 3.8, 7)  (0, 2.8, 7)  (5, 7.4, 10)  
F8 (0, 1.5, 5) (0, 1.3, 7) (7, 9.5, 10) (3, 5.4, 9) (7, 9, 10)  (3, 5, 7)  (0, 0.1, 3)  (3, 3.6, 9)  (0, 0.4, 3)  (3, 7.8, 10)  
F9 (0, 1.6, 5) (0, 1.4, 7) (7, 9.9, 10) (3, 5.8, 9) (7, 9.9, 10)  (1, 5, 7)  (0, 0.1, 3)  (3, 5.4, 9)  (0, 2.0, 5)  (5, 8.2, 10)  
F10 (0, 2.0, 5) (0, 1.0, 5) (7, 9.6, 10) (3, 6.2, 9) (7, 9.9, 10)  (0, 1.6, 5)  (0, 0.1, 3)  (3, 5, 7)  (0, 1.2, 5)  (3, 8.2, 10)  
F11 (3, 6.4, 10) (0, 0.7, 5) (7, 9.6, 10) (1, 6.4, 9) (7, 9.6, 10)  (0, 0, 1)  (0, 0.1, 3)  (0, 2.8, 5)  (0, 2.2, 5)  (5, 7.8, 10)  
F12 (0, 1.0, 5) (0, 0.5, 3) (7, 9.6, 10) (3, 6.2, 9) (7, 9.1, 10)  (0, 0, 1)  (0, 0.1, 3)  (0, 1.2, 5)  (0, 0.7, 3)  (3, 7.4, 10)  
F13 (0, 0.8, 5) (0, 0.4, 5) (7, 9.7, 10) (1, 6.4, 9) (7,9.9, 10)  (0, 0, 1)  (0, 0.1, 3)  (5, 7.6, 10)  (0, 0.8, 3)  (5, 7.6, 10)  
F14 (0, 1.7, 5) (0, 0.6, 3) (7, 9.7, 10) (1, 6.0, 9) (7, 9, 10)  (0, 0.1, 3)  (0, 0.1, 3)  (0, 1.6, 7)  (0, 0.1, 3)  (5, 8.4, 10)  
F15 (0, 1.3, 5) (0, 1.3, 5) (5, 9.2, 10) (3, 6.4, 9) (5, 8.8, 10)  (0, 0, 1)  (0, 0.1, 3)  (0, 1, 3)  (0, 1.1, 5)  (3, 5.6, 9)  
F16 (7, 9.6, 10) (7, 8.6, 10) (7, 9.6, 10) (3, 6.0, 9) (7, 9.9, 10)  (0, 0, 1)  (0, 0, 1)  (3, 5, 7)  (0, 2.6, 5)  (3, 6.2, 9)  
F17 (0, 1.2, 5) (0, 1.5, 5) (5, 9.2, 10) (1, 6.4, 9) (5, 8.6, 10)  (0, 0.1, 3)  (0, 0, 1)  (0, 0.8, 3)  (0, 1.3, 5)  (5, 8.6, 10)  
F18 (1, 1.8, 7) (0, 1.2, 5) (5, 8.6, 10) (0, 5.6, 9) (5, 8.6, 10)  (0, 0.1, 3)  (0, 0, 1)  (0, 0.5, 3)  (0, 0.9, 5)  (3, 6.0, 10) 
F19 (0, 2.2, 5) (0, 1.3, 5) (5, 7.7, 10) (0, 5.8, 9) (5, 7.8, 10)  (0, 0.8, 3)  (0, 0.1, 3)  (0, 0.3, 3)  (0, 1.6, 7)  (3, 5.6, 9)  
F20 (0, 0.5, 3) (0, 1.2, 5) (7, 9.6, 10) (0, 6.0, 9) (5, 8.0, 10)  (0, 0.8, 3)  (0, 0.1, 3)  (0, 0.4, 3)  (0, 0, 1)  (3, 5.8, 9)  
F21 (0, 1.1, 5) (0, 1.4, 5) (5, 9.4, 10) (1, 6.2, 9) (5, 8.4, 10)  (0, 0.7, 3)  (0, 0.1, 3)  (0, 0.6, 3)  (0, 1.4, 5)  (3, 5.2, 9)  
F22 (0, 0.1, 3) (0, 0.5, 3) (7, 9.3, 10) (0, 1.6, 5) (5, 7.8, 10)  (1, 3, 5)  (0, 0.1, 3)  (0, 1, 7)  (0, 0.3, 3)  (3, 5.8, 10)  
F23 (0, 0, 1) (0, 0.1, 3) (5, 8.7, 10) (0, 5.4, 9) (5, 8.6, 10)  (0, 0, 1)  (0, 0.1, 3)  (0, 0.7, 3)  (0, 0.5, 7)  (3, 5.6, 10)  
F24 (0, 0.1, 3) (0, 0, 1) (5, 9.1, 10) (1, 5.6, 9) (5, 8.6, 10)  (0, 0.1, 3)  (0, 0.1, 3)  (1, 5.2, 9)  (0, 1.3, 7)  (1, 4.4, 10)  
F25 (0, 0.2, 3) (0, 0.8, 5) (5, 9.3, 10) (0, 3.2, 7) (7, 9, 10)  (0, 0.1, 3)  (0, 0.1, 3)  (0, 0.2, 3)  (0, 0.7, 5)  (1, 4.0, 7)  
F26 (0, 0.3, 3) (0, 0.6, 5) (7, 9.7, 10) (0, 3.2, 7) (5, 7.6, 10)  (0, 0.1, 3)  (0, 0.1, 3)  (0, 1.0, 5)  (0, 0.4, 5)  (1, 4.2, 10)  
F27 (0, 0.3, 3) (0, 0.6, 5) (5, 9.2, 10) (0, 2.2, 7) (0, 6.4, 9)  (0, 0.1, 3)  (0, 0.1, 3)  (0, 0.9, 5)  (0, 0.5, 5)  (1, 4.8, 10)  
F28 (0, 0.2, 3) (0, 0.8, 5) (7, 9.7, 10) (0, 2.8, 7) (3, 6.8, 9)  (0, 0.1, 3)  (0, 0.1, 3)  (0, 1.3, 5)  (0, 0.7, 5)  (1, 3.8, 7)  
F29 (0, 0.3, 3) (0, 1.3, 5) (7, 9.8, 10) (0, 2.4, 7) (3, 5.6, 9)  (0, 1, 3)  (0, 0.1, 3)  (0, 1.4, 5)  (0, 0.6, 5)  (1, 4.2, 7)  
F30 (0, 0.3, 3) (0, 0.8, 5) (5, 8.9, 10) (0, 2.6, 7) (3, 5.2, 9)  (0, 0, 1)  (0, 0.1, 3)  (0, 0.9, 3)  (0, 1.0, 5)  (1, 3.2, 7)  
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Using the Eqs. (2) and (3), the fuzzy decision matrix is normalised and the weights are 
applied. This produces a normalised weighed fuzzy matrix. Afterwards, the fuzzy positive 
ideal solution (FPIS) and the fuzzy negative ideal solution (FNIS) are obtained as shown 
in Table 9. 
Table 9. The fuzzy positive and negative ideal solution (FPIS, FNIS) 
FPIS ሾሺ ?ǡ  ?ǡ  ?ሻǡ ሺ ?ǡ  ?ǡ  ?ሻǡ ሺ ?ǡ  ?ǡ  ?ሻǡ ሺ ?ǡ  ?ǡ  ?ሻǡ ሺ ?ǡ  ?ǡ  ?ሻǡ ሺ ?ǡ  ?ǡ  ?ሻǡ ሺ ?ǡ  ?ǡ  ?ሻǡ ሺ ?ǡ  ?ǡ  ?ሻǡ ሺ ?ǡ  ?ǡ  ?ሻǡ ሺ ?ǡ  ?ǡ  ?ሻሿ 
FNIS ሾሺ ?ǡ  ?ǡ  ?ሻǡ ሺ ?ǡ  ?ǡ  ?ሻǡ ሺ ?Ǥ ? ?ǡ  ?Ǥ ? ?ǡ  ?Ǥ ? ?ሻǡ ሺ ?ǡ  ?ǡ  ?ሻǡ ሺ ?ǡ  ?ǡ  ?ሻǡ ሺ ?ǡ  ?ǡ  ?ሻǡ ሺ ?ǡ  ?ǡ  ?ሻǡ ሺ ?ǡ  ?ǡ  ?ሻǡ ሺ ?ǡ  ?ǡ  ?ሻǡ ሺ ?Ǥ ? ?ǡ  ?Ǥ ? ?ǡ  ?Ǥ ? ?ሻǡ ሿ 
The distance of the failure modes to the FPIS and FNIS are then evaluated using the vertex 
method (equation 28 and 29). A correlation coefficient for each failure mode is evaluated 
and then ranked. 
In summary, the analysis presents the following failure modes given in Table 10 as the top 
10 most critical in the SCM. 
Table 10. Top 10 Failure modes from Fuzzy TOPSIS analysis 
Failure Mode 
Ranking 
Failure Modes Failure ID 
1 Severe leakage from HP DCV F5 
2 Severe leakage on the LP Shuttle valve  F9 
3 Loss of power supply from the SEM Unit  F1 
4 SCM housing check valve cracks open at lower pressure  F2 
5 Loss of HP Accumulation  F7 
6 Total Loss of signal from the SEM module  F3 
7 Severe leakage from LP DCV  F8 
8 Loss of HP hydraulic filtration  F6 
9 Loss of LP Accumulation  F11 
10 Severe leakage on HP shuttle valve  F10 
A correlation of 93.5% is observed between the top 10 most critical failure modes obtained 
from the conventional FMEA study and those obtained from the fuzzy TOPSIS-based 
evaluation. The conventional FMEA analysis shows that F1 (loss of power supply from the 
29 
 
 
SEM unit) is the most critical failure in the SCM, while the fuzzy TOPSIS technique 
recognizes the severe leakage from HP DCV (F5) as the most critical failure mode. Even 
though F1 is ranked in third place according to the fuzzy TOPSIS FMEA study, it still is 
known as a critical failure mode. F9 (severe leakage in the LP shuttle valve) is ranked as 
the second most critical failure mode in both the analyses. The third most critical failure 
mode under the conventional FMEA methodology is loss of HP accumulation (F7), whereas 
this is ranked as fifth critical failure mode according to the fuzzy TOPSIS analysis. A 
certain level of variations is observed between the rankings obtained on the basis of RPN 
values and those obtained using the fuzzy TOPSIS method. It is worth noting that the fuzzy 
TOPSIS analysis applies a weighted set of criteria for the evaluation while the Failure 
mode, effects and criticality analysis (FMECA) evaluation assumes equal weights to its 
risk factors (occurrence, severity and detectability). 
The results obtained from this study were also compared to data reported in Offshore and 
Onshore Reliability Data (OREDA) as a baseline database in the oil and gas industry. The 
OREDA JIP has established a comprehensive database with reliability and maintenance 
data for exploration and production equipment from a wide variety of geographic areas, 
installations, equipment types and operating conditions.  
7KH IROORZLQJ HTXLSPHQW¶V DUH FRYHUHG LQ WKH 25('$ UHOLDELOLW\ GDWDEDVH ± Control 
systems (including topside controls, subsea control module, umbilicals), flowlines, 
manifolds, production risers, running tools, wellhead and Xmas trees, templates and subsea 
pumps. OREDA makes it possible to extract and analyse failures with some defined 
similarities, to calculate variables like failure rates, downtimes, to trend and perform 
benchmarking. The subsea database is used by the participating companies to record their 
real life data on their subsea experience. This provides a sound platform for the exchange 
of subsea info among participating companies and the users. 
The analysis conducted on data obtained from OREDA was based on subsea installations 
located in water depths ranging from shallow water 22m to deepwater 1300m in a 
combination of satellite, manifold templates and clustered well developments. A total of 
7,480 subsea control modules were used in the analysis in fields covering the North Sea, 
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Gulf of Mexico (GoM), the West African waters, Guinean gulf, Adriatic Sea and West of 
Shetland. Again, a combination of driverless and diver-assist systems were analysed.  
The analysis showed that the subsea electronic module has the highest number of failures 
as 42.7% of the component failed representing a whopping 70.30% of the entire number of 
failures recorded during the period of the failure survey. This is closely followed by the 
SCM solenoid valves in which a total of 66 failed representing a total of 17.98% failure 
during the same period. The analysis also revealed the subsea electronic module (SEM) as 
the primary source for critical failures in the SCM. The SEM failures caused a total of 
64.94% of the SCM critical failures. Critical failures in the SCM are the failures leading to 
loss in production from associated well. Normally, this will involve retrieval, repair and 
replacement or an outright replacement of the faulty SCM. The analysis also showed the 
failures of solenoid control valves as the second highest critical failures in the SCM. These 
are the LP and HP directional control valves (DCVs) which are responsible for the control 
of the production tree valves, and the surface controlled subsurface safety valve (SCSSV), 
the intelligent control and chemical injection valves.  
The fuzzy TOPSIS analysis shows that severe leakage from HP DCV (F5) is the most 
critical failure mode in the SCM. The HP DCV controls the surface controlled subsurface 
safety valve (SCSSV), a primary well control barrier. It also controls the downhole 
intelligent control valves. These two functions are very critical to the performance of oil 
and gas production wells as any failure may lead to system breakdown and subsequently 
loss of production. The results also show that severe leakage on the LP shuttle valve (F9) 
is the second most critical failure in the SCM. The valve is responsible for powering all LP 
valves in the subsea tree system, making it a key component of the SCM. On the third 
position is loss of power supply from the SEM Unit (F1).  
In summary, the analysis shows that around 80% of the most critical failure modes in the 
subsea control module (SCM) come from the directional control valves (DCVs) while 
around 20% are in relation to the subsea electronic module (SEM). The analysis also 
demonstrates that leakage in directional control valves is a major issue in SCMs as 40% of 
the most critical failures are related to this failure mode. The outcomes of the above 
analysis from OREDA validate the fuzzy TOPSIS analysis results shown above.  
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It should be noted that although the results may show little difference from a conventional 
FMEA for this particular application, the approach adopted could draw significantly 
greater differences in other problems, as the proposed method represents the decision 
making model in a more systematic way, reducing bias from the inputs. Further, the criteria 
selected are widely applicable to other offshore, marine and subsea applications due to their 
generic nature. The methodology developed can overcome some of the fundamental 
limitations of traditional FMECA, such as like the duplication of the RPNs, the unscientific 
nature of the crisp risk factors while careful selection of criteria can also consider 
condition-based risk assessment which can further expand the scope of semi-quantitative 
methods of risk assessment. 
From a methodological point of view, the proposed approach allows for flexibility in the 
selection of the criteria of the analysis leading to a better defined ranking of risks and hence 
permitting more effective mitigation strategies, Reliability-Centered Maintenance (RCM), 
Risk-based Inspection (RBI), etc. In the case where appropriate criteria are selected, a 
dynamic risk assessment can even take place, updating initial estimations with information 
about the current state of a system.  
6 &RQFOXVLRQ 
In this paper, a fuzzy TOPSIS-based failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) model was 
presented to identify, analyse and evaluate the failure modes of a subsea control module 
(SCM). The analysis focused on thirty most critical failure modes in the SCM, where a 
criticality assessment was conducted and the failure modes were ranked using the 
conventional RPN technique. The FMEA study revealed that there are several major 
drawbacks in prioritizing failure modes using the RPN technique, e.g., lack of 
consideration of the relative importance between risk factors, difficulty of allocating a crisp 
number to risk factors, etc. A fuzzy TOPSIS-based method was proposed to overcome 
these limitations and it eventually revealed the most critical failure modes as listed in Table 
10. 
A high level of correlation between the top 10 most critical failure modes obtained from 
the conventional FMEA study and those obtained from the fuzzy TOPSIS-based evaluation 
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was observed. However, the use of linguistic terms in the fuzzy TOPSIS approach enabled 
the experts to express their judgments more realistically and hence improving the 
applicability of the FMEA technique in offshore oil and gas industry. Comparison of the 
derived results with the reported failures through the OREDA database countersigned 
validity of the approach. 
The methodology that has been followed in this paper, risk prioritisation through Fuzzy-
TOPSIS analysis, can be applied to other complex systems with the aim of improving the 
conventional FMEA technique to make it more practical for various industries. 
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